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The Germans 
Frederick Luebke 
IN 1928, MIDWAY BETWEEN the two world wars, H. L. Mencken 
observed that with few exceptions the leaders of the Germans in America 
were an undistinguished and unintelligent lot, a collection of mediocri-
ties, most of whom had something to sell. The few national German 
ethnic organizations still in existence, he noted, were led by entirely 
unimportant men. Moreover, the leaders of German immigrant churches 
were nonentities, unknown to the general public. The blame for this 
lamentable dearth of leadership, in Mencken's view, rested upon the 
German Americans themselves, who displayed an unfortunate tendency 
to follow inferior men. As Catholics they are slaves of their priests, he 
said; as Protestants they are slaves of their pastors; and when they leave 
the church they become slaves of the first political buffoon they encoun-
ter. During World War I, in Mencken's judgment, they had turned almost 
instinctively to fools for leadership.1 
Mencken's surpassing skill in verbal hatchetry tends to overshadow 
the perceptive qualities of his analysis. Though he was a prisoner of his 
elitist prejudices, Mencken described circumstances that were typical of 
most immigrant groups in America. The vast majority of persons had 
emigrated in search of a better life. Coming from the lower classes of 
Europe, they were culturally backward persons who inevitably devoted 
their energies in America to material advancement. This worked against 
the emergence of wise and able leaders. When an educated and cultured 
person attempts to lead the apathetic masses of immigrants, Mencken 
wrote, he quickly becomes discouraged and succumbs to despair as his 
place is taken by demagogues, self-servers, and other third-rate noise-
makers. 
Yet, because of World War I, the experience of Germans in America 
was qualitatively different from that of any other immigrant group. The 
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largest non-English-speaking group in the country, the Germans had 
already begun to arrive in the eighteenth century. They prospered in this 
country and were well received. They were proud of their language and 
culture; while many Germans assimilated with remarkable speed, others 
labored mightily to erect a complex of institutions that served to sustain 
ethnic culture. When German immigration dropped off sharply at the end 
of the nineteenth century, ethnic leaders sought to inhibit the inevitable 
disintegration of the group by espousing a new cultural chauvinism. 
Later, when Germany experienced its early successes in World War I, 
the leaders of German America were encouraged to exploit the Kaiser as 
a symbol around which to rally the group, thereby bolstering a consider-
able financial investment in ethnic newspapers and a variety of other 
business establishments. An unprecedented measure of support seemed 
to unify the German Americans and to stimulate their leaders ever more 
boldly to Haunt partisanship for Germany. At the same time this behavior 
was infinitely offensive to persons whose emotional attachments were with 
the Allies. The advocates of the Allied cause, led by President Woodrow 
Wilson and other champions of English culture, began to attack German-
American leaders as disloyal and un-American. Unsure of the capacity of 
American society to assimilate ethnic diversities, they began a war on 
German culture in America as early as 1915. The German Americans, 
however, saw themselves as entirely loyal to the United States. In their 
view, strict neutrality was in the nation's best interest, while Wilson's 
policies would lead to war. That nonintervention worked to Germany's 
benefits was as incidental as the fact that Wilson's understanding of the 
national interest served to aid the Allies.2 
The entry of the United States into the war in 1917 radically altered 
the circumstances of German Americans. Behavior that had been legal in 
the neutrality period was now tantamount to treason, and most persons 
of German birth or descent, regardless of citizenship, were suspected of 
nurturing some measure of loyalty for Germany. Although the spirit of 
oppression was not uniformly felt across the country, the German-Ameri-
can community generally experienced much persecution. Superpatriots 
delineated a new, narrowed conception of loyalty and demanded con-
formity from everyone. A fierce hatred for everything German pervaded 
the nation. German cultural symbols were debased; instruction in the 
language was practically eliminated in the schools; the use of the German 
language was restricted on the state and local levels; and German-lan-
guage newspapers were harassed and censored. Gradually suspicion esca-
lated to threats of violence, to forced sales of government war bonds, to 
liberal applications of yellow paint to churches, schools, and monuments, 
to v~dalism, book-burnings, Hag-kissing, tar-and-feather ceremonies, 
and, in one case, the lynching of an innocent German alien. 
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The German-American community was devastated by these events. For 
the majority of the seven million persons of German stock in the United 
States at that time, German ethnicity had become a source of social dis-
comfort or deprivation. Countless families ceased conversing in the Ger-
man language. Name changes were common among persons, businesses, 
and societies. Thousands stopped subscribing to German-language news-
papers and periodicals. Memberships in ethnic organizations of all kinds 
plummeted. As a group, the German Americans were embittered, dis-
illusioned, and demoralized, unsure of what appropriate behavior should 
be. For most of them, ethnicity had lost its savor. The injustices of World 
War I remained imprinted upon their memories, and they were eager to 
express their resentment in the polling booths. But above all they wanted 
to prevent a recurrence of the persecution. They were convinced that this 
could be accomplished best by avoiding obvious displays of German 
ethnicity. Few were ready to respond to a leader who promised to solve 
the problems of the Germans as an ethnic minority group. The majority 
were not interested in the promotion of ethnic consciousness or in the 
political defense of das Deutschtum. 
At the core of the German ethnic group, however, were persons whose 
commitment to ethnicity was primary. They were convinced that the 
problems of the Germans in the United States were due to past failures 
of ethnic leadership. They believed that German Americans had been 
insufficiently aggressive during the prewar years, especially in politics, 
and that if German-American citizens would participate vigorously in 
political affairs at all levels their power would be such that no one would 
dare trample upon their rights. The most prominent of these ethnic chau-
vinists was George Sylvester Viereck, the notorious propagandist of Ger-
many's cause during the neutrality period of 1914-17. In September, 
1919, a time when German Americans still suffered from sporadic super-
patriotic violence, Viereck published an editorial on German ethnic 
leadership in his periodical, the American Monthly, as he had renamed 
the Fatherland of the prewar years. Noting that the Germans were a 
numerous and powerful force in American politiCS, he observed that they 
were now floundering for the want of a national leader. The need, he 
wrote, was for a new Carl Schurz, a man whose record of loyalty and 
service to the nation was impeccable, someone above envy and petty 
intrigue who could combine the wrangling and conflicting subgroups of 
German Americans and lead them by inspiring word and courageous 
deed out of the wilderness of war to a promised land of respect and 
honor. He should have financial independence and mastery of the English 
language, announced Viereck, and he must not be a recent immigrant or 
a newspaper man. As a possibility, Viereck mentioned Charles Nagel, 
who was well known among German Americans as the secretary of com-
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merce in former President Taft's cabinet. But judging from his subsequent 
behavior, Viereck had himself in mind as the new leader of his ethnic 
groUp.3 
Viereck's editorial evoked a variety of responses over the next several 
months. Most reveal how deeply German Americans were wounded by 
the humiliations of the war period and how earnestly they desired a 
restoration to their former status. Moreover, most respondents called for 
some form of political organization as the means to unite the group and 
to articulate its goals. The names of many persons were naively suggested 
as potential leaders in these letters, which collectively demonstrate a 
shallow understanding of the German ethnic group, its characteristics, 
and its relationships to the larger American society.4 
The fact was that there was no possibility of a national leader arising 
who would fit the mold that Viereck described. The Germans in America 
never had had one in the past, not even the revered Schurz. This was 
because they were so diverse socially, economically, culturally, and polit-
ically that there was no common interest strong enough to bind them 
together. They were as heterogeneous as the nation itself, with its rich 
and poor, its educated and undereducated persons, its urban and rural 
divisions, its occupational range from unskilled laborers to mightly indus-
trialists and financiers. The Germans included people who organized their 
lives around religious values and those who were secular minded; there 
were pietists and ritualists, Catholics and Protestants, Democrats and 
Republicans. 
Unlike blacks, Chicanos, or Japanese, the Germans had no serious social 
or economic problems to unite them in a struggle against oppression. 
They had never been discriminated against in a serious way except dur-
ing the World War I era, and even then it had not been universal or uni-
form. When the Germans had been persecuted it was chiefly because 
of the tenacity with which they clung to their language and culture. 
Even though German language and culture were not in fact as uniform 
as they appeared, their defense was the only foundation upon which a 
potential leader could base his appeal. Because it was in the economic 
interest of the press to emphasize ethnic unity and cultural maintenance 
and because leaders had no choice but to stress it in their speeches, senti-
ment in favor of nurturing the German language and culture appeared to 
be strong. Yet it was rarely capable of overcoming the centrifugal forces 
of personal or subgroup interest. 
The inadequacy of ethnicity as a cohesive force was due also to the 
fact that the Germans, in their physical, linguistic, and cultural character-
istics, were close to Anglo-American norms. Indistinguishable in appear-
ance from dominant elements of American society, they were persons 
of Christian heritage who spoke a language closely related to English. 
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It was possible for them to assimilate with astonishing ease if they so 
chose. When the retention of obviously German behavior became a source 
of discomfort or deprivation, as during World War I, the proportion of 
those who consciously abandoned ethnicity was dramatically enlarged. 
In their long history in the United States, the Germans acted in concert 
only in response to external threats or events that impinged upon their 
culture. Prohibition, legislative threats to parochial schools, and anti-
German propaganda are examples of issues that could temporarily stimu-
late German Americans to unity. When the threat disappeared, possibili-
ties for strong leadership also vanished. If the defense of ethnic culture 
was the only basis for leadership, it was inevitable that when German-
American voices were heard in the land, they sounded negative, harsh, 
and unattractive to old-stock Americans. 
The alternative lay in the kind of leadership exemplified by Carl 
Schurz. As a politician, Schurz had not pursued specifically German-Amer-
ican interests. Even though he was willing enough to exploit German-
American votes, he was essentially an American statesman who happened 
to have been born and educated in Germany. While his cultural heritage 
certainly influenced his goals and methods, his political appeal was rarely 
circumscribed by ethnicity. It was the quality of leadership in national 
affairs that gave him status and position. When he spoke on the issues, 
the nation as well as German Americans listened, even though they often 
did not agree with him. Thus Schurz's role as spokesman for his ethnic 
group was almost incidental-a by-product of his national leadership. 
In the years following World War I, however, there was no one of 
German birth or descent of comparable stature on the national scene. 
Nagel probably came the closest. But he, like most men of modest fame 
in the political, business, or academic worlds, had no desire to be identi-
fied as the leader of the Germans. As for those persons who were closely 
tied to ethnic organizations, most were unknown to the public at large 
or were broken in spirit by the events of the World War-men such as 
Dr. Charles Hexamer, the former president of the defunct National Ger-
man-American Alliance. There remained the vainglorious Viereck. 
Though his notoriety as a propagandist eliminated him from any sub-
stantial leadership role, Viereck saw himself in a different light. 
The German immigrant churches in particular would have nothing to 
do with Viereck and his ilk. They had been the chief victims of super-
patriotism, and superpatriotism had been stimulated by the verbal 
excesses of the German ethnic chauvinists. For the churches, ethnicity 
had been primarily a means to achieve religious ends; when it tended to 
hinder rather than to ease the attainment of their goals, they readily 
abandoned programs of language and culture maintenance. Most church 
leaders distrusted political activity as a way to accomplish their objec-
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tives, and they remained deeply suspicious of the ethnic political organi-
zations, perceiving them as the heirs of the liberal, anticlerical traditions 
brought to America by the refugees of the revolutions of 1848.5 
In most denominations there was a remarkably swift transition to 
English-language services in the first postwar decade, a mandatory step 
if the loyalty of the younger generation was to be retained. German-lan-
guage church periodicals were gradually replaced by English equivalents. 
Most parochial schools converted to instruction in the English language. 
In the Evangelical Synod and in several Lutheran synods, notably the 
Iowa and Ohio synods, these alleged "nurseries of Kaiserism" virtually 
disappeared. Meanwhile, dozens of German Methodist congregations 
withdrew from German conferences and merged with parent organiza-
tions. Transition to English usage was especially dramatic in German 
Catholic parishes, and membership in the German Catholic Central-
Verein, the national layman's organization, dropped to one-half of its 
prewar figure during the 1920s. Even the isolationist, pacifistic Menno-
nites, though slower to give up the use of German, developed extraordi-
nary benevolence programs and voluntary relief work to demonstrate in 
positive ways their worth as American citizens.6 
John Baltzer, president of the Evangelical Synod during the early 
1920s, was typical of many German-American church leaders of the time. 
He repeatedly declared that his church, though German in origin, was 
thoroughly American in spirit and constitution. Yet he opposed the move-
ment led by the great American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, then a 
young parish pastor in Detroit, to merge the Evangelical Synod with 
other denominations. As a moderate, Baltzer admitted the inevitability 
and even the desirability of the transition to English, but he pleaded for 
a slowing of the process for the sake of clergymen and parishioners who 
could not accommodate themselves to an abrupt change. At the same 
time, some denominations, notably the Lutheran Church-Missouri 
Synod, inaugurated broad programs to equip the faithful for life in an 
English-speaking church. Sermons, instructional materials, religious liter-
ature, hymns, and prayers were published in English in the hope that 
orthodoxy could be sustained as linguistic barriers fell. 7 
In some respects the traditionally anticlerical Amerikanische Turner-
bund acted much like the churches. Its leaders also believed survival 
depended upon transition to a nonethnic basis. By the 1920s, its political 
radicalism was only a memory, its name had been legally changed to 
the American Gymnastic Union, its periodical, the AmerikaniYche Turn-
zeitung, included many columns of English-language articles, and its 
adult male membership dwindled to about 30,000 persons. Its national 
chairman, Theodore Stempfel, strongly objected to German ethnic politics 
and disapproved of mass protest meetings. The assimilationist drift of the 
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Turnerbund was not unopposed, of course, and its leaders were bitterly 
attacked by the faithful, both within and without the organization.8 
On the local level, thousands of ethnic clubs, societies, and associations 
of all kinds continued to exist, despite the corrosive effects of the anti-
German hysteria. Some of their members advocated the conversion of 
their Vereine to "American" institutions, but most hoped to enjoy unob-
trusively the pleasures of ethnic sociability, to celebrate their culture 
with drink and song, and to reap the economic rewards of ethnic contacts 
within the privacy of their organizational quarters. 9 A few societies 
experienced a resurgence of life after the war, as they were strengthened 
by persons whose ethnic consciousness had been awakened by wartime 
persecutions.lO In many of the large cities, dozens of these societies were 
united into an umbrella organization, such as the influential United Ger-
man Societies of New York and Vicinity.ll Orinarily not given to political 
activity, the umbrella organizations often coordinated charitable endeav-
ors, such as relief programs for war sufferers in Germany, and promoted 
annual German Day cultural festivals, which by 1920 had begun to 
revive. Some members of the Vereine feared that organized political 
involvement was a senseless rocking of a leaky boat. But others attacked 
such attitudes as promoting self-indulgence, complacency, and a decep-
tive spirit of security. They urged participation in the activities of the 
two national organizations for German ethnic political action that had 
emerged in the immediate postwar period.12 
The first of these was the Deutsch-Amerikanische Biirgerbund, or the 
German-American Citizen's League, which had its origin in Chicago 
under the leadership of Ferdinand Walther. It was deliberately patterned 
on the discredited National German-American Alliance, with state and 
local branches organized wherever sufficient interest could be generated. 
The Biirgerbund was dedicated to the revival of German language and 
culture and was motivated by a spirit of revenge. George Sylvester 
Viereck found such militancy to his liking and, for a time, served as its 
eastern regional director. Its leadership consisted largely of' former 
National Alliance officers, but, unlike that organization, it was openly and 
avowedly political. In August, 1920, when it sponsored a national confer-
ence to support the presidential candidacy of Republican Warren G. 
Harding, it resolved "to sweep from office all miscreants, irrespective of 
party, who abused the authority conferred upon them by the people for 
the prosecution of the war, to make war upon their fellow citizens, who 
hounded and persecuted Americans of German descent, . . . who, con-
temptuous of any hyphen except the one which binds them to Great 
Britain, unmindful of the supreme sacrifice of Americans of German blood 
in the late war, attempt even now to deprive our children of the noble 
heritage of speech and song and prayer that has come down to us from 
our sires beyond the sea."13 
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The Biirgerbund was formally organized as a national body at a poorly 
attended meeting in Chicago in January, 1921, when it adopted a series 
of resolutions defining its policies and commenting on current national 
and international issues.14 Never very successful on the national level, the 
Biirgerbund was inHuential chieHy in Chicago and the Midwest, but 
even there it lacked the support of the German-language press. No Ger-
man ethnic leaders of importance emerged from the organization. Its 
strategy was excessively chauvinistic; it spelled trouble in an intolerant 
age. I5 
The second national organization was the Steuben Society of America. 
Founded originally as a secret society in 1919, it was no less committed 
to political action than the Biirgerbund. It also sought to protest against 
the treatment which Americans of German descent had suffered during 
the war, and it accepted the theory that if the Germans could unite they 
could hold the balance of political power in the United States. But this 
organization recognized that German Americans also had to establish 
their credentials for civic virtue and patriotism. Instead of screaming for 
its rights to be recognized, the Steuben SOciety hoped to demonstrate 
that it deserved respect. Hence, it constantly urged energetic participation 
by its members in the political life of America and, as its name suggests, 
publicized the contributions of Germans to the greatness of America 
from colonial times to the present. Its defense of Germany in international 
affairs was less strident than what was typical of the Biirgerbund, and to 
the disgust of the chauvinist radicals, it chose English as its official lan-
guage. The Steubenites believed that this strategy would bring sufficient 
status and power to prevent the German Americans from being perse-
cuted or ignored politically in the future. I6 
Although the Steuben Society became the best-known national Ger-
man-American organization in the two decades between the wars, it also 
produced no significant leaders. Carl E. Schmidt of Detroit, an aging 
businessman of moderate wealth and culture who had played a minor 
role in Michigan politics, consented to serve as national chairman, but he 
never gave more than symbolic leadership to the society, which was cen-
tered in New York City. Thus, leadership fell by default to Theodore H. 
Hoffmann, who was hobbled by acting chairman status until Schmidt's 
death in 1934.17 As an instrument of German-American unity, the Steuben 
Society was also a failure. Throughout the interwar period it suffered 
from indecisive leadership, internal dissension, and severe criticism from 
German Americans outside the organization. Despite the respectability 
it enjoyed, its membership never exceeded twenty thousand. I8 
Even so, the Steuben Society's strategy was consonant with the advice of 
the historian Ferdinand Schevill, who had urged, in response to Viereck's 
1919 editorial on the lack of German ethnic leadership, that any action 
the Germans took should be preceded by a self-examination "to discover 
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the qualities. . which have invited hostility and contempt." Such dis-
passionate reflection was difficult for the chauvinists; it was impossible for 
Viereck, who seemed to have learned nothing from the war. Eagerly seek-
ing distinction as the leader of the German Americans, Viereck plunged 
into the political waters as the presidential election of 1920 approached. 
He exhorted his fellows to unified political activity in order to force 
decision-makers in the national government to recognize German-Ameri-
can political power and to reward it when used to their advantage. He 
energetically supported the candidacy of Republican Warren G. Harding 
with every means at his disposal. First he tried to establish a German-
American political action group which he called the Committee of 96. 
When it failed to catch on, he shifted to the Biirgerbund which, like 
almost all the German-language newspapers, endorsed Harding, not 
because they regarded him highly, but rather as a means to defeat Demo-
crat James Cox, whom they despised as the political heir of Woodrow 
Wilson. Everywhere Viereck preached boldness to the intimidated Ger-
man Americans, and everywhere the press, to his delight, identified him 
as their leading spokesman. Indeed, as the campaign drew to a close, 
Cox singled out Viereck as his whipping-boy, as he denounced the return 
of hyphenism to American politics. But Viereck was not dismayed; such 
treatment was to be expected if he was to project himself successfully as 
the dauntless leader of all German Americans who were properly con-
scious of their ethnicity.19 
Viereck's claim to ethnic leadership had little substance. The New 
York Times and other newspapers gave him much publicity because he 
was articulate and arrogant; apparently they assumed that he was also 
influential. But most German Americans, including the publishers of the 
German-language press, ignored or disputed his claims to leadership; 
many found his extremism appalling.2o It is true that in the election of 
1920 the majority voted overwhelmingly for Harding, as did the elector-
ate generally, but they would have done so even if Viereck had remained 
silent. 21 
Viereck pressed on. Remembering Schurz's alleged delivery of the 
German-American vote to Abraham Lincoln in 1860 and his subsequent 
reward of the ministry to Spain, Viereck dispatched a congratulatory 
telegram to Harding with a reminder that six million Americans of Ger-
man descent had voted Republican as he had predicted.22 In January the 
Biirgerbund resolved to send a five-man delegation, including Viereck, 
to visit Harding before he took office and urge him to consider the great 
contributions of Germans to America when he made his cabinet appoint-
ments.23 
Harding politely received the Biirgerbund delegation on February 16, 
1921, while vacationing in Saint Augustine, Florida. The president-elect 
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understood fully that he owed no debts to Viereck or, indeed, to the 
German-American voting population as a group. He assured the delega-
tion that no candidate for high appointive office would be discriminated 
against because of German birth or descent. The effect of Viereck's well 
publicized visit was to make it politically impossible for Harding to appoint 
a German American to any significant position, regardless of the candi-
date's qualifications. Ethnic politics, especially German, was simply 
repugnant to large numbers of native-stock voters. The Buffalo Express, 
for example, denounced the Viereck visitation as "ridiculously impudent," 
and in Kansas the Salina Journal called it "insolent stupidity." The Amer-
ican Legion protested against what it perceived as a German-American 
demand to receive an appointment to the cabinet. In Texas the state leg-
islature adopted a resolution endorsing the stand taken by the Legion.24 
Viereck and the chauvinists were disappointed with Harding's refusal 
to appoint a German American to high office. Even though it was appar-
ent that their tactic was bound to be counterproductive, given the xeno-
phobic tendencies of the times, they continued to pressure the President, 
especially in autumn, 1921, when the position of ambassador to Austria 
fell vacant. Instead of agreeing on a single candidate, each of several 
activist elements within the German community, mainly in New York, 
lobbied for their own men. In the end Harding appointed a non-
German.25 
The whole affair resulted in laying bare a deep division within the 
ranks of Germans who were committed to united ethnic action. The Vier-
eck clique believed in the open organization of raw political power; some 
even seemed to think that a frankly German political party would be 
ideal. They were opposed by persons, usually German-language news-
paper editors and publishers, who were influential as leaders in local 
umbrella organizations. Fearful of renewed nativistic recriminations 
against the Germans, this group of leaders espoused a more covert strat-
egy. They preferred to limit the public display of German ethnicity to 
cultural and social affairs such as German Day celebrations, bazaars, and 
benefit concerts. Meanwhile, they hoped to negotiate privately with 
leaders of the major political parties, trading German ethnic support for 
promises to pursue policies they favored. They wanted to bargain under 
circumstances where rationality and discretion could prevail, without the 
extremism of either Viereck and his followers or of latter-day super-
patriots such as the leaders of the American Legion. No less committed 
to German ethnic goals than the extremists, these moderates believed 
they could gain more for the Germans at less risk. Chief among them 
were the Ridder brothers, Bernard and Victor, the owners and publishers 
of the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, one of the largest and most influential 
of the German-language newspapers in the United States.26 
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Once it was apparent that no German American would get the Vienna 
post, Viereck began a sustained attack on the Ridders, Paul Mueller of 
the Chicagoer Abendpost, F. W. Elven of the Cincinnati Freie Presse, and 
the German-language press generally. Incensed by their refusal to pub-
licize, much less support, the activities of the Biirgerbund and other 
chauvinist groups, Viereck denounced them in January, 1922, as "rene-
gade J udases" of "supine docility" and "bovine passivity" who meet "in 
secret conclave" with log-rolling politicians. In April he published his 
version of how the Ridder brothers, by their meddling, had .prevented 
Bernard Heyn, a German-American attorney of New York, who had been 
a member of the delegation that had visited Harding, from getting the 
Austrian ambassadorship. The Ridders, charged Viereck, had inherited, 
not earned, their positions of leadership and were motivated solely by 
desire for financial gain. He complained that any potential leader who 
failed to concur in their dictation could expect to be punished by being 
denied publicity in the German-language press. Viereck pointed out that 
the Ridders' alleged manipulation had led to their banishment from the 
halls of the socially prestigious Liederkranz, whose president, William 
O. C. Kiene, had also become tangled in the Austrian imbroglio. Viereck 
dragged out what he considered to be dirty laundry from the war period 
to incriminate the Ridders. Finally, he reported that "throughout the 
country, Americans of German descent, desirous of bringing about har-
mony, are in open revolt against such individuals claiming leadership."27 
Viereck's outbursts inevitably alienated intelligent men of good will 
among the German Americans. Frustrated by his failure to attract a sub-
stantial number of followers, Viereck next broadened his verbal attack to 
include his chief journalist rivals, the editors of Issues of To-Day, George 
Abel Schreiner and Frederick Franklin Schrader. Their periodical, closely 
tied to the Steuben Society of America, was strongly pro-German, like the 
American Monthly, but was better edited and more moderate in tone. 
In Viereck's indictment, Schreiner committed the crime of defending the 
French on one occasion, and Schrader had expressed some doubt about 
the truth of all the stories then circulating about forced prostitution of 
German women for black French soldiers then occupying the Rhine-
land.28 But Viereck continued to suffer a steady erosion of support. Ulti-
mately he was unable to command publicity in either the American or 
German-language press. 
During the next two years the German ethnic group seemed to acquire 
a new sense of community. The storm-cellar mentality of the immediate 
postwar period faded as German-American leaders became more openly 
assertive of their rights and hopes. They made frequent references in their 
speeches and editorials to the wartime persecution their people had 
endured, and fresh voices were heard in favor of political organization. 
The Amerikanische Turnerbund, for example, received new, aggressive 
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leadership in the person of. George Seibel. He urged German Americans 
to ignore their differences, to unite in order to fight prohibition and other 
forms of cultural imperialism, and to denounce such international injus-
tices to Germany as the French invasion of the Ruhr. Similarly, the 
United German Societies of New York acquired a Lutheran clergyman, 
Dr. William Popcke, as its president; he also espoused political organiza-
tion to prevent the disintegration of Germany.29 The German-language 
press also waxed more aggressive. The New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, for 
example, agreed that the time had come for all German Americans to 
develop a powerful, united political organization for their own self-pro-
tection and self-interest.3o The Steuben Society of America emerged as 
the dominant political organization as the more radical Biirgerbund faded 
from the national scene. The New York Times, as well as the Staats-
Zeitung, frequently publicized Steuben Society leaders and activity. 
Meanwhile, sympathy in the United States for Germany grew as the 
Weimar Republic struggled with inHation and the occupation of the 
Rhineland and the Ruhr. At the same time, revisionist historians and 
journalists, building on the widespread disillusionment with the Peace of 
Versailles, explained the origins of the Great War in terms much less 
favorable to Britain and France than given in the "official" version. Thus, 
as the election of 1924 approached, it appeared that German ethnic polit-
ical action could succeed, even though the nation continued to be 
troubled by excesses of racism, xenophobia, and superpatriotism. 
Most German Americans were disappointed with the major party can-
didates for president in 1924. Calvin Coolidge meant only a continuation 
of a Republicanism that had done little for them. Democrat John W. 
Davis was a hopeless compromise candidate who, to the Germans, sym-
bolized Wall Street and the kind of financial manipulations that had 
dragged the United States into the war. Thus, when Robert M. LaFol-
lette, their battle-scarred hero from the days of the World War, ran as 
a third-party candidate, the majority of the German ethnic leaders rushed 
enthusiastically to his support. They loved him not so much for what he 
favored as for what he opposed. All they asked of any candidate was that 
he be against British and French dominance in international affairs, 
against the Versailles settlement and any arrangement, such as the Dawes 
Plan, that tended to perpetuate it, against the international bankers of 
Wall Street, and against the restrictive immigration legislation of 1924. 
If a candidate had a record of having opposed prohibition, woman 
suffrage, and American entry into the World War, so much the better. 
German ethnic politics thus rested on a foundation of negativism; posi-
tive goals were rarely defined. Since party loyalty did not exist, German 
ethnic leaders could shift easily from a conservative Harding in 1920 to 
a progressive LaFollette in 1924. 
The Steuben Society of America was especially active in the election 
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of 1924. Its Political Committee sponsored a conference of German-Amer-
ican leaders in Chicago early in June to hammer out a platform for the 
edification of the major parties in their national conventions.3! In August 
the SSA met to endorse LaFollette, and in September it staged a great 
rally in Yankee Stadium in New York. LaFollette himself addressed the 
assembly of forty thousand and told them with his usual eloquence what 
they wanted to hear-that Germans were hardworking, valuable citizens 
who had, by their intelligence, thrift, and endurance, contributed immeas-
urably to America's greatness. Crowds heard similar speeches at meetings 
staged in many other cities, including Philadelphia, Buffalo, Chicago, 
San Francisco, and Portland. By these means the German leaders hoped 
to demonstrate that their people were good patriotic Americans who hap-
pened to speak the German language and to value German culture; they 
were determined to revise the image of the German American as being 
more interested in Germany than the United States.32 
Still, memories of World War I remained vivid. No longer, announced 
the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, will German Americans allow themselves 
to be muzzled, slandered, or harassed. The enemies of Deutschtum can 
be routed if German Americans will work together to present a united 
front.33 "The German elements," wrote Frederick Franklin Schrader, 
"knows when it is insulted, ignored, and impugned. It has a whole reg-
ister of grievances, and since the policy is to dampen the smoldering fires 
of discontent rather than to put out the fire, the explosion will take place 
in due time, and it will not be to the liking of the powers that be."34 
Viereck reminded his readers that "no official rebuke was ever admin-
istered to the wretches who were guilty of . . . outrages [against Ameri-
cans of German descent] except in a mild Presidential protest, utterly 
inefficient in checking the tendency to declare American citizens of 
German blood beyond the protection of the law."35 Meanwhile, the 
national press gave extensive coverage to the activities of the Steuben 
Society and reported in considerable detail the political preferences of 
German leaders in the various states.36 
But even with the LaFollette candidacy, the Germans could not achieve 
unity; it was impossible to define the group interest to everyone's satis-
faction. It is true that the majority of the German-language newspapers 
condemned both the Democrats and the Republicans as they endorsed 
LaFollette, but the old divisions between the extremists and the more 
cautious editors and publishers had not disappeared.37 Fearing a repeti-
tion of Viereck's strategy of 1920, F. W. Elven, the publisher of the Cin-
cinnati Freie Presse, authored a lengthy editorial in which he reviewed 
the "flagrant tactlessness" of the Biirgerbund with its policy of ethnic 
separatism and of making demands in return for concessions. The appro-
priate leaders of the German ethnic group, insisted Elven, were the pub-
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lishers of the German-language press; it was their duty to prevent "per-
sons who lack every qualification of leadership to force themselves into 
prominent positions and by their blunders compromise the cause 6f the 
German element." Elven argued that circumstances made ethnic political 
activity unwise. "We have our hands full at present to make amends for 
the sins of men of German blood who do not take their oath of allegiance 
too seriously and refuse to recognize the fact that we are not living in a 
German colony."38 While Elven did not mention Viereck by name, it is 
clear whom he had in mind when he upbraided incompetent and imperti-
nent political amateurs who "immurred themselves with their itching 
vanity and monumental self-esteem." Others shared Elven's view. 
Schrader, for example, urged that the Steubenfest in Yankee Stadium be 
divested of all suggestions of "hyphenism" that were so susceptible to 
exploitation by "Anglomaniacs, Ku Kluxers, and the New York Morgan 
Gazettes." Nothing, he said, must be done "to suggest that our citizens 
of German origin expect either privileges or rewards in return for the 
solidarity they will manifest" on election day.39 The German American 
World agreed with Elven that the Viereck visit to Harding was stupid 
and that German ethnic political segregation was the greatest of follies. 
ref\f adii'ere(f'fo -ffi~ noti~n that J if the German el~ment J was ,~~ reassert' 
its claim to that position of influence to which it is historically and eco-
nomically entitled," it must remain neutral in the political contest until 
partisan lines are distinctly defined and then assign its weight to the 
candidate or party that is compatible with the German interest.40 
\I).'i::'I'et:\\. "Was ()u'tragea by 'Riven s attacK and publisbed a lengthy 
defense of his own behavior. Later he countered with charges that 
German-language newspapers that supported Coolidge, such as Elven's 
Freie Presse, did so because they had been bribed with lucrative adver-
tising contracts arranged by the Republican campaign committee. Viereck 
associated such corruption with the tragic suicide of Hans Hackel of the 
Saint Louis Westliche Post; but he reserved special scorn for Val J. 
Peter, publisher of the Omaha Tribune, who, according to testimony 
given before a congressional investigating committee, had flipped to 
Coolidge late in the campaign in return for $12,500,41 
Any prominent German who disagreed with the dominant pro-LaFol-
lette position was severely criticized in the German-American press. 
When Charles Nagel, whose loyalty to the Republican party was above 
reproach, announced that he intended to vote for Coolidge on the basis 
of nonethnic issues, the Steuben Society prepared a long rebuttal. The 
society charged that Nagel, though proud of his German heritage, chose 
Coolidge because he was the Saint Louis representative of the Republican 
powers of Wall Street. 42 
The failure of LaFollette to win election in 1924 underscores the inabil-
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ity of the German-American leaders to marshal the ethnic vote. They 
obviously had not wielded the balance of political power, even though a 
substantial portion of his five million votes was cast by persons of German 
birth or descent. Many thousands had also voted for the major party 
candidates, especially Coolidge. It was apparent that either major party 
could ignore the Germans if such a course were otherwise in their inter-
est. Nevertheless, the German ethnic leaders continued to delude them-
selves. Carl Schmidt wrote that his Steuben Society had finally shed the 
party yolk. "If we continue to throw our vote whichever way our con-
science may dictate, we will compel the respect of all parties, and will 
henceforth receive consideration by whatever party may be in power." 
Viereck insisted that support for LaFollette had cut across all German 
ethnic classes and group divisions; he even toyed with the idea of a third 
party "recruited largely from the German element."43 Viereck, Schmidt, 
and other leaders knew that German Americans generally were still 
bitter about their wartime treatment; they erroneously assumed that the 
masses would translate their resentment into unified political action. This 
capacity to misinterpret experience and to believe only that which con-
formed to preconceptions gives substance to Mencken's observation that 
the Germans in America were led by mediocrities. Yet the actual voting 
behavior of German American citizens belies his charge that they almost 
instinctively followed fools. 
There was no way that the strategy urged by the Steuben Society of 
America could produce strong political leadership among the Germans. 
In this view, party loyalty was an evil; support was to go to the party 
that would cater to the ethnic group interest. Such a policy precluded 
the possibility of a German ethnic leader achieving prominence in one of 
the major parties.44 Election to important political office was therefore 
impossible. The only remaining avenue to a leadership position was to 
work through ethnic organizations such as the Steuben Society. But this 
alternative offered no long-term promise, for the Germans constituted a 
disintegrating constituency-a melting iceberg, in the words of one 
observer. Moreover, the Steuben Society as a matter of policy played 
down the leadership of its officers. Despite his many years of service at 
the head of the Steuben Society, Theodore Hoffmann was not even well 
known among Gennan Americans. 
The bankruptcy of the idea that the Germans held the balance of 
political power in the United States, provided they could unite, was made 
manifest by the presidential election of 1928, when they were hopelessly 
split by the candidacies of Herbert Hoover and Al Smith. One group 
insisted that Smith's Democratic party was still the party of Woodrow 
Wilson, William McAdoo, and A. Mitchell Palmer and that the hated 
prohibition amendment had been foisted upon the American people by 
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Southern Democrats. Hoover, they said, was of German descent and 
proud of it; besides, he had saved thousands of Germans from starvation 
in his relief work after the war. But others saw Hoover as a pro-British 
conservative and a prohibitionist. They much preferred the Irish-Cath-
olic Smith, with his open record of opposition to prohibition, his distrust 
of England, and his support for liberal, progressive measures. Capitaliz-
ing on this sentiment, the Democratic National Committee flaunted the 
names of persons who endorsed Smith, including the well-known former 
Republican Congressman Richard Bartholdt of Missouri, Theodore Hoff-
mann of the Steuben Society, Charles Korz of the Catholic Central-
Verein, Val Peter of the Omaha Tribiine, baseball players Babe Ruth and 
Lou Gehrig, and even the disdainful H. L. Mencken.45 But there were 
still other Americans of German descent, chiefly pietistic Protestants, 
who favored Hoover precisely because he was "dry." After the election, 
the usually apolitical Christliche Apologete, a Methodist periodical, 
hailed the new chief with a full-page portrait. Meanwhile Lutherans 
rejected Smith simply because he was Catholic.46 
The German-American press was similarly divided. A few newspapers, 
including Elven's Cincinnati Freie Presse, endorsed Hoover. A few more, 
such as Paul Mueller's Chicagoer Abendpost, supported Smith. But the 
great majority, the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung among them, were reluc-
tant to offend any significant number of their subscribers and remained 
independent or even ignored the election entirely.47 
The Steuben Society of America was incapable of providing leadership 
under these conditions. At first its organ, the Progressive, edited by 
Frederick Franklin Schrader, dismissed Hoover as pro-British and praised 
Smith as the champion of all that was dear to German Americans. In 
August, however, Schrader made a sudden switch, offered apologies to 
Hoover, and recommended his election. Certain local branches of the 
SSA also publicly announced for Hoover, but the national organization, 
wracked by internal dissension, finally endorsed Smith in mid-October. 
It severed its ties to the Progressive and declared the Steuben News, the 
publication of the New York council, to be its official voice in the future. 48 
After the fiasco of 1928, German Americans spoke less of what could 
be accomplished through political unity. References to World War I 
became less frequent. Viereck abandoned all pretense of ethnic leadership 
as he surrendered the editorship of the American Monthly to others. 
The Steuben Society of America continued to exist, of course, but its 
effectiveness was scorned in many quarters. Unable to agree on presi-
dential candidates, it unintentionally abdicated a national leadership role 
as it concentrated on state and local politics. Meanwhile, the Steuben 
News larded its pages with glowing accounts of the heroic deeds of the 
ethnic fathers. Sanitized tales of Steuben, Schurz, De Kalb, Lieber, Sigel, 
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and many others were repeated ad nauseam, as ever more obscure Amer-
icans of German origins were discovered and publicized in this effort to 
lay claim to authentic Americanness. 
But the number of German Americans who were attracted by such 
unrelieved filiopietism diminished steadily. By the end of the 1920s the 
Americanizers were firmly in control of most German immigrant churches. 
The number of German-language publications, including church period-
icals and trade journals, dwindled to one hundred seventy-two, only a 
fourth of the prewar figure, and the multifarious Vereine continued to 
atrophy and die. In 1930, Oscar Illing, editor of Die Neue Zeit of Chicago 
and an old-time German-American journalist in the Viereck mold, deliv-
ered an extended lamentation on the impending fate of German America. 
Illing saw betrayal everywhere. No ethnic institutions, least of all the 
German-language press, escaped his jeremiads: all were led by fearful, 
self-serving cowards who avoided controversy and gave lip service only 
to the maintenance of language and culture. In his view, singing societies, 
for example, had degenerated into English-speaking businessmen's clubs 
where German songs could sometimes be heard, but were sung by hired 
singers. Illing could offer no remedy for the dissolution of ethnicity; he 
repeated the threadbare lines about political unity, but admitted it was 
impossible of attainment. He refused to understand that for the ethnic 
masses, immigrant language and culture could not be perpetuated beyond 
the point of their social or psychological utility. Illing wanted German 
Americans to organize in order "to cultivate the imponderable properties 
of German culture," and he resented it fiercely when ordinary people 
could not share his elitist values. The only bright spot in Illing's ethnic 
world was the new Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation, which he under-
stood to be a great German-American cultural institute of imposing char-
acter and financial power sure to compel respect.49 
Although the Schurz Foundation never became quite what Illing imag-
ined, it was symbolic of a new emphasis in German ethnic life at the 
beginning of the 1930s. The futility of the political strategy having finally 
become obvious, leadership fell increasingly to the moderates, led by the 
editors and publishers who stressed the importance of cultural education 
programs.50 Still, new efforts were made to create national organizations 
capable of serving the interests of Germans in America. One of these, 
the German-American Federation of the U.S.A., embodied all the cultural 
goals of the Steuben Society but specifically rejected politics as a means 
to achieve them. Merely a revival of the old prewar National German-
American Alliance, it had difficulty attracting supporters, partly because 
of the interest shown in it by several American proto-Nazi organizations. 51 
More important was the National Congress of Americans of German 
Descent, an informal conference which met in New York in October, 
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1932, under the auspices of the German-American Conference of Greater 
New York and Vicinity. The guidance of the Ridder brothers was much 
in evidence at this meeting. Cynically interpreted, the congress was an 
attempt by the German-language press to sustain and revive the ethnic 
community in a time of economic distress, just as the officers of participat-
ing ethnic organizations hoped thereby to preserve their positions of 
authority and respect. 
The United States was approaching the depth of the Great Depression 
at the time of the first National Congress of Americans of German Des-
cent. It was surprisingly well attended. Most delegates represented 
national, regional, and city organizations and alliances, but ethnic craft 
unions, socialist workers groups, and church bodies had no interest in 
such an affair. At the core of the congress were cultural chauvinists whose 
prosperity and education permitted them the luxury of cherishing ethnic 
heritage for its own sake. Many speakers urged the assembly to lead the 
German element to its rightful place in American society. Their repeated 
use of such words as "recognition" and "respect" demonstrate that they 
were still troubled by the status deprivation engendered by World War I. 
The congress seemed to Hounder about in search of some device or some 
institution that promised to preserve ethnic culture. It supported pro-
posals to create an institute for research in ethnic language and culture, 
and to establish German houses at universities, German-language instruc-
tion programs, information bureaus, and cultural exchanges with Ger-
many. The least realistic was a proposal to create a German-American 
university. 52 
Meanwhile, the Schurz Foundation had been established in Phila-
delphia. Supported by substantial contributions from several wealthy 
German-American businessmen and industrialists, it made no pretense to 
ethnic leadership per se. Instead, the foundation promoted cultural 
exchange programs and sought to acquaint Americans with German cul-
tural achievements through its beautifully edited magazine, American-
German Review, which started in 1934.53 
Philadelphia was also the scene of the second National Congress of 
Americans of German Descent, held in October, 1933, in commemoration 
of the 250th anniversary of the first German settlement in America in 
1683 at Germantown. Devoid of new ideas and unable to overcome the 
constrictions of economic depression, the congress movement died there-
after. Quite sensibly, neither the first nor the second congress had shown 
any concern for Germany, possibly out of fear of being identified with 
Nazism. But both congresses also tended to ignore the problems of the 
approximately four hundred thousand immigrants from Germany who 
entered the United States during the 1920s.54 
When the older generation of immigrants (or "Grays," as they were 
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traditionally called) commented at all on the postwar arrivals from Ger-
many ("Greens"), it was usually in uncomplimentary terms. They were 
distressed chiefly because the latter showed little interest in the preser-
vation of Deutschtum and often formed organizations of their own rather 
than supporting older, established institutions, most of which desperately 
needed the backing of the newcomers. In one instance, the Greens were 
even criticized for joining the liberal Evangelical Synod, which was pre-
sumably less committed to German-language maintenance, rather than 
the conservative, orthodox Missouri and Wisconsin Lutheran synods. 
Observers in Germany also disparaged the postwar emigrants as having 
an unprecedented proportion of complainers and renegades who, after 
one year in America, preferred to speak bad English rather than good 
German.55 
The Greens themselves saw their circumstances differently. One of 
their most eloquent spokesmen was Dr. Fritz Schlesinger of New York, 
who addressed the first National Congress of Americans of German Des-
cent in 1932. He reminded the assembled Grays that the postwar immi-
grants had come seeking a new life, believing that America offered them 
more opportunities and better security than did Germany. Unlike the 
earlier immigrants, most of whom were farmers and workers who had 
arrived before 1895, the Greens were representative of all levels of Ger-
man SOciety, including a disproportionate number of intellectuals. The 
majority, said Schlesinger, were interested in a rapid acculturation and 
hence tended to regard the use of the German language as a necessary 
evil during the transition period. They had not pursued Deutschtum in 
America and generally considered it a hindrance to a successful adjust-
ment. Schlesinger explained that soon after their arrival these immigrants 
discovered that most ethnic associations were interested in perpetuating 
an outmoded form of German culture. Moreover, the Vereine seemed 
both unprepared and unwilling to serve the needs of the newcomers. 
Forced to be self-reliant, the Greens therefore used the societies for the 
only thing they were good for-convenient social contacts .. The idea that 
the immigrant had a duty of some kind to preserve Deutschtum in Amer-
ica never occurred to them. Schlesinger further pointed out that most of 
the agencies for cultural preservation, such as the Carl Schurz Memorial 
Foundation, the Goethe Society of America, the many singing societies, 
and the great umbrella organizations like the United German Societies 
and the German-American Conference, were almost exclusively run by 
second- and third-generation German Americans. 56 
The problem of German-American unity, according to Schlesinger, 
concerned social class much more than people were willing to believe. 
Americans of German descent completely overlooked the fact that Ger-
many was a land sharply divided into social strata and that in their pri-
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vate social relationships Germans rarely crossed the traditional lines. 
Upon his arrival in America, the newcomer found persons of all classes 
and occupations mixed together in the Vereine; furthermore, the leaders 
seemed chiefly to be "self-made" men, economically successful but cul-
turally deficient. Thus, the immigrant intellectuals-academics and pro-
fessional people, many with language problems that forced them to 
accept work beneath their educational level-felt economically inferior 
but culturally superior to most of the German Americans. Made uncom-
fortable by this anomaly, they often preferred to seek admission to Amer-
ican circles rather than to ethnic organizations. Yet these persons were 
precisely the ones who were expected to be the new champions of Ger-
man Geistesgiite. Even the simpler people among the Greens, Schlesinger 
observed, sensed a provincialism or the lack of progressive or modern 
spirit among the German-American leaders. Finally, Schlesinger pleaded 
for a deeper involvement in American political affairs, not in terms of the 
German ethnic group interest, but in the service of the entire American 
society. Ties to German political parties must be severed, he said, and 
preoccupation with daily political events in Germany must end, if Ger- . 
man American unity was to be achieved. 
Schlesinger, a Jew, was obviously thinking of the Nazi party and the 
advent of Adolf Hitler, who came to power in Germany three months later. 
Other postwar immigrants were also thinking of Hitler, but in rather 
more favorable terms. American Nazi organizations were formed as early 
as 1924. Their memberships consisted almost exclusively of urban workers 
or proletarianized members of the German middle class who found few 
of their American dreams fulfilled. In their frustration, they consciously 
rejected assimilation, disparaged American life, and embraced fascism. 
At no time did the Nazi organizations attract a collective membership of 
more than a few thousand persons. 57 But because of their ideology of 
authoritarianism, racism, and extreme nationalism, they crowded the 
staid, bourgeois German-American societies from the stage of public 
attention, beginning with Hitler s rise to power in 1933. From then until 
the American entry into World War II, the activities of the Friends of 
the New Germany and its successor, the so-called German-American 
Bund, were daily fare in the New York Times and other major metropol-
itan newspapers. By the end of the decade, Fritz Kuhn, the leader of the 
Bund, was the best-known German in America.58 
American Nazi organizations, like the older ethnic societies, were also 
concerned with German-American unity and leadership. But instead of 
basing their appeal on culture, the Nazis used race. In their view, all 
Germans everywhere were united by blood and were thereby bound in 
loyalty to the Fatherland. Anti-Semitic and anti-Communist propaganda 
was spread to attract popular support; brutal methods and threats of 
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violence were employed in a series of efforts, most of them unsuccessful, 
to take over or to discredit the old umbrella organizations and the Steu-
ben Society. 
The leaders of the German-American Bund repeatedly demonstrated 
ignorance of American society and of the place of German immigrants in 
it. They understood nothing of American ideals and values or of the 
extent to which the masses of German Americans shared them. The efforts 
of Kuhn and his coterie to assume the leadership of German America on 
dictatorship principles must be written off as an abject failure. Even 
the German foreign ministry was frequently embarrassed by Bundist 
blunders and took all steps short of outright repudiation to control the 
organization. 
Yet the American Nazis succeeded in keeping the established leaders 
of the ethnic group off balance. This was partly due, of course, to the 
apparent success of the Hitler government in both domestic and foreign 
affairs during the 1930s. Few prominent old-line German-American 
leaders were willing to speak out forcefully and consistently against Nazi 
outrages, so proud were they of the positive accomplishments of the new 
regime. They took delight in the way Hitler violated the detested Treaty 
of Versailles. The leaders of the Americanized German churches likewise 
refrained from condemning Hitlerism.59 Indeed, some of the churchmen 
seem to have been encouraged to indulge in their own versions of anti-
Semitism.60 Unlike secular societies, the churches did not count Jews 
among their members. Thus, only German-Jewish and Socialist organi-
zations fought vigorously and relentlessly against American Nazism from 
1933 to World War II.61 
As a matter of policy, the leaders of the old organizations generally 
avoided commenting on Nazi excesses. In the cases of the churchmen, 
silence was partly the consequence of their Weltanschauung; disposed to 
divide human affairs into two separate worlds of the sacred and the pro-
fane, they rarely discussed contemporary issues of any kind. But the 
leaders of the secular organizations were fearful of losing their positions 
of prestige. Their societies had already been enervated by depression and 
assimilation, and they were reluctant to risk alienating even small parts 
of their constituencies. Some leaders were practically driven to take 
strong anti-Nazi stands by the Bundists, whose bully tactics left them no 
choice. Their moral perceptions dulled by ethnocentrism, the leaders of 
the German-American Conference of New York and the Steuben Society 
of America refrained from taking a forthright anti-Nazi stand until 1938, 
when the insolence and contempt of the Nazi challenge to their leader-
ship was so general it could no longer be ignored.62 
Two other events in 1938 stimulated a somewhat more general and open 
criticism among German Americans of Hitler and National Socialism. 
One was the imprisonment in a concentration camp of Pastor Martin 
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Niemoller, a special hero of German Protestants who had been a com-
mander of a German submarine in World War I. The other was the 
Kristallnacht pogrom of November 1938, touched off by the assassination 
in Paris of a German diplomat by a young Polish Jew. These acts finally 
goaded both the Kirchendeutsche and the Vereinsdeutsche into condemn-
ing Nazism.63 But even thereafter, muted pride in Hitler's deeds was 
more common in the German-language press than was consistent con-
demnation.64 Some small-town newspapers, such as the Fredericksburg 
[Texas] Wochenblatt, concentrated on local news and ignored the world 
crisis generally; a great many papers, among them the Sheboygan [Wis-
consin] Amerika, tried to present a neutral or objective reporting of the 
news; a few, such as the Iowa Reform [Davenport] and the Dakota Freie 
Presse [Bismarck], were clearly pro-German, anti-Semitic, isolationist, 
and intensely anti-Roosevelt. 
Just before World War II began in 1939, Carl Wittke, the eminent his-
torian of German America, who was then a dean at Oberlin College, 
encapsulated the moral problem faced by the leadership in his own 
ethnic group. It was apparent, Wittke wrote, that newspaper accounts 
of Nazi atrocities against the Jews were not exaggerated and that there 
were millions of persons in Germany who were appalled by the policies 
of the Hitler regime. But instead of giving moral support to honorable 
men who were fighting against fearful odds for decency, humanity, and 
brotherhood, the leaders of the German element preferred to extol the 
glories of the "Forty-eighters" and their flaming liberalism while excusing 
Nazi excesses as a passing phase or characterizing "the noble fuehrer" 
as an unfortunate "victim of an ignorant or brutal minority of his party."65 
While H. L. Mencken had been disdainful of German ethnic group 
leadership, Wittke was simply disgusted. He was offended by their moral 
obtuseness and narrow chauvinism. It is clear, moreover, that their record 
over the two decades of the interwar period is distinguished by neither 
insight nor foresight. Most spokesmen for the group, self-appointed or 
otherwise, were deficient in understanding their constituencies and how 
they, as leaders, might relate to the great masses of Americans of German 
origins or descent. Remarkably various in economic status, religious 
belief, and even in language and culture, most German Americans, unlike 
the core of leaders, were not moved primarily by ethnic considerations. 
Hundreds of thousands of persons who were technically counted as Ger-
man Americans had no significant measure of identification with the 
ethnic group. Indeed, some were antagonistic to programs for the preser-
vation of ethnic identity. Others perceived ethnicity as inhibiting the 
attainment of other goals deemed more important. Church Germans, for 
example, abandoned ethnicity at an accelerated pace during the 1920s 
and 1930s. 
But even those leaders who shared the desire for ethnic unity could 
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not agree on how it should be attained. Some persisted in strategies that 
were inevitably counterproductive, given the character of the times, and 
thus stimulated further fragmentation of the ethnic group. Filled with 
bitterness and resentment over their treatment in World War I and per-
turbed by an enduring sense of having lost status, they first hoped to 
regain respect through united ethnic political action. Some advocated the 
use of raw political power; others preferred persuasion. After the political 
strategy had failed repeatedly during the 1920s, they shifted to an empha-
sis on culture. But their programs were based upon elitist values at var-
iance with those of the masses. The leaders refused to believe that immi-
grant language and culture could not be effectively perpetuated beyond 
the period of social or psychological utility. Vitiated by the Great Depres-
sion, cultural programs faded as the American Nazis, ever bold and arro-
gant, captured public attention with their strategy of blood. This racist 
quest for German-American unity, appealing chiefly to recent, postwar 
immigrants, was so antipathetic to American ideals and habits of thought 
and attitude that it eventually drove most traditional German-American 
leaders into opposition. This meant that, except on the local or personal 
levels, the attainment of ethnic group goals by means of organized activ-
ity was abandoned with the advent of World War II. 
One may scarcely speak of German ethnic leadership in the United 
States since World War II. The Steuben Society of America, the Catholic 
Central-Verein, the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation, the American 
Turners, and more than a dozen other national organizations continued 
to exist, sustained by large numbers of German-speaking refugees from 
central and eastern Europe who arrived during the 1940s and 1950s.66 
Old patterns persist. The attitudes of the old Burgerbund are presently 
reincarnated in the Deutsche-Americanische National Kongress and in 
the Federation of American Citizens of German Descent. Their rhetoric 
and strategies often seem unchanged from what they were in the 1920s.67 
But no one listens; these organizations, united chiefly by a hatred of 
Communism, are unknown to the general public and ignored by most 
German Americans who may have heard of them. Meanwhile, German 
ethnicity thrives in many hundreds of local Vereine throughout the land, 
but especially in major centers of German population, such as New York, 
Cleveland, and Chicago, plus Florida and California. They gather 
together persons whose attachment to the German language and culture 
is more emotional than intellectual, more social than political, who are 
interested chiefly in maintaining an associational environment in which 
they may converse, dine, play, sing, and dance with others who share 
their values and attitudes.68 Ironically, it is this dimension of German 
life in America that the chauvinists of half a century ago predicted could 
not survive without their leadership. 
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